The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the
Showing posts with label Constitutional Law II. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Constitutional Law II. Show all posts
6.06.2012
ABS-CBN v. PMSI
FACTS:
Philippine Multi-Media System Inc (PMSI) is a signal provider which has cable and satellite services. It is providing its satellite services through Dream Broadcasting System. PMSI has its “Free TV” and “Premium Channels”. The Free TV includes ABS-CBN, GMA-7 and other
Philippine Multi-Media System Inc (PMSI) is a signal provider which has cable and satellite services. It is providing its satellite services through Dream Broadcasting System. PMSI has its “Free TV” and “Premium Channels”. The Free TV includes ABS-CBN, GMA-7 and other
Labels:
Constitutional Law II,
Digest
4.27.2012
mmda v. Garin
FACTS:
Respondent Garin was issued a
traffic violation receipt and his driver’s license was confiscated
for parking illegally. Garin wrote MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta
requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference for
case to be filed in Court. Without an immediate reply from the reply
from the Chairman, Garin filed a complaint for preliminary injunction
assailing among other that Sec 5(+) of
Labels:
Constitutional Law II,
Political Law
Acebedo v. CA
Facts:
Acebedo Opticalappliedfor a business permit tooperatein Iligan City.
After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Cabili of Iligan
granted the permit but he attached various special conditions
whichbasicallymade Acebedo’s dependent upon prescriptions to be
issued by local optometrists. Acebedo
Labels:
Constitutional Law II,
Political Law
4.24.2012
Public Highways vs San Diego
Commissioner of Public Highways vs San Diego
31 SCRA 616
Facts: Before WWII, the Philippine Government filed an action for the expropriation of a parcel of land owned by Hashim for the construction of a public road. Government took possession over the property after the deposit of the amount of 23, 413.64. Records of the case were destroyed during the WWII. After the war, Hashim filed an action for money claims before the CFI against Bureau of Public Highways.
The parties entered into a compromise agreement wherein the Bureau shall pay almost half of the amount claimed. The bureau failed to pay so Hashim filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent judge granted the motion. The sheriff served the writ with a Notice of Garnishment to PNB against the Bureau's funds. Hashim further filed a motion for issuance of an order ordering the release of the amount. It was granted. PNB released the amount. Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari with mandatory injunction to reimburse the amount released.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the State may invoke its immunity from suit
2. Whether or not the State may impugn the validity of the compromise agreement
3. Whether or not the orders were valid
Ruling: In expropriation proceedings, the State submits to the court's jurisdiction and asks the court to affirm its right to take the property sought to be expropriated. State immunity does not apply.
Only the principal can question the authority of the counsel to enter into a compromise agreement. The state cannot raise it.
The assailed orders are void. Government funds are not subject to garnishment.
31 SCRA 616
Facts: Before WWII, the Philippine Government filed an action for the expropriation of a parcel of land owned by Hashim for the construction of a public road. Government took possession over the property after the deposit of the amount of 23, 413.64. Records of the case were destroyed during the WWII. After the war, Hashim filed an action for money claims before the CFI against Bureau of Public Highways.
The parties entered into a compromise agreement wherein the Bureau shall pay almost half of the amount claimed. The bureau failed to pay so Hashim filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent judge granted the motion. The sheriff served the writ with a Notice of Garnishment to PNB against the Bureau's funds. Hashim further filed a motion for issuance of an order ordering the release of the amount. It was granted. PNB released the amount. Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari with mandatory injunction to reimburse the amount released.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the State may invoke its immunity from suit
2. Whether or not the State may impugn the validity of the compromise agreement
3. Whether or not the orders were valid
Ruling: In expropriation proceedings, the State submits to the court's jurisdiction and asks the court to affirm its right to take the property sought to be expropriated. State immunity does not apply.
Only the principal can question the authority of the counsel to enter into a compromise agreement. The state cannot raise it.
The assailed orders are void. Government funds are not subject to garnishment.
Oposa v. Factoran
Different Compilation of Digests
-------------------------------------------------
FACTS:
-------------------------------------------------
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was initiated by the Philippine Ecological Network Incorporated (PENI) together with the minors Oposa and their parents. All were duly represented. They claimed that as taxpayers they have the right to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the country’s rainforests. They prayed that a judgment be rendered ordering Honorable Factoran Jr, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?
HELD: Yes, petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the country’s forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
--------------------------------------------------
FACTS:
The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants’ right as taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility” in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earth’s capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the “greenhouse effect”.
Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case
Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can render a valid judgement in accordance to the prayer of the complaints
Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing that these cancellation of these TLAs are against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
HELD:
The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers’ (class) suit. The subject matter of complaint is of common and general interest to all the citizens of the Philippines. The court found difficulty in ruling that the appellants can, for themselves, and for others file a class suit.
The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has been clearly stated. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. The granting of the TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology hence, the full protection thereof requires that no TLAs should be renewed or granted. The appellants have also submitted a document with the sub-header CAUSE OF ACTION which is adequate enough to show, prima facie, the violation of their rights. On this basis, these actions must therefore be granted, wholly or partially.
Despite the Constitution’s non-impairment clause, TLAs are not contracts, rather licenses; thus, the said clause cannot be invoked. Even if these are protected by the said clause, these can be revoked if the public interest so required as stated in Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705). Furthermore, Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: “The State shall protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.” The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the government. The said right is also clear as the DENR’s duty – under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded. It is not a contract, property or property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?
HELD: Yes, petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the country’s forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
--------------------------------------------------
FACTS:
The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants’ right as taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility” in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earth’s capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the “greenhouse effect”.
Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case
Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can render a valid judgement in accordance to the prayer of the complaints
Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing that these cancellation of these TLAs are against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
HELD:
The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers’ (class) suit. The subject matter of complaint is of common and general interest to all the citizens of the Philippines. The court found difficulty in ruling that the appellants can, for themselves, and for others file a class suit.
The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has been clearly stated. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. The granting of the TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology hence, the full protection thereof requires that no TLAs should be renewed or granted. The appellants have also submitted a document with the sub-header CAUSE OF ACTION which is adequate enough to show, prima facie, the violation of their rights. On this basis, these actions must therefore be granted, wholly or partially.
Despite the Constitution’s non-impairment clause, TLAs are not contracts, rather licenses; thus, the said clause cannot be invoked. Even if these are protected by the said clause, these can be revoked if the public interest so required as stated in Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705). Furthermore, Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: “The State shall protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.” The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the government. The said right is also clear as the DENR’s duty – under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded. It is not a contract, property or property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
------------------------------------------
Facts:
Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' classsuit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and, the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was thedefendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
(2) Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit.
(3) Whether or not the TLA’s can be out rightly cancelled.
(4) Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.
Held: As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
---------------------------
Supplement: Article written by DANTE GATMAYTAN-MAGNO
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and, the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was thedefendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
(2) Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit.
(3) Whether or not the TLA’s can be out rightly cancelled.
(4) Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.
Held: As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
---------------------------
Supplement: Article written by DANTE GATMAYTAN-MAGNO
Bengson III v.Cruz and HRET
Facts:
Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in SanClemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicablewas the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the United
11.08.2011
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislature’s target in the enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nation’s economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.
- a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
- aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.
- provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.
- provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business
- it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process
- the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
- the Act violates international and treaty obligations
- the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislature’s target in the enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nation’s economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.
Labels:
Constitutional Law II,
Political Law
Republic vs. Meralco [G.R. No. 141314. November 15, 2002.]
Facts:
On 23 December 1993, Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the revision of its rate schedules. The application reflected an average increase of P0.21/kwh in its distribution charge. The application also included a prayer for provisional approval of the increase pursuant to Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of Executive Order 172. On 28 January 1994, the ERB issued an Order granting a provisional increase of P0.184/kwh, subject to the condition that in the event that the Board finds that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase in rates, all excess amounts collected from the applicant’s customers as a result of this Order shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor for application to electric bills covering future consumptions. Subsequent to an audit by the Commission on Audit (COA), the ERB rendered its decision adopting COA’s recommendations and authorized MERALCO to implement a rate adjustment in the average amount of P0.017/kwh, effective with respect to MERALCO’s billing cycles beginning February 1994. The ERB further ordered that “the provisional relief in the amount of P0.184/kwh granted under the Board’s Order dated 28 January 1994 is hereby superseded and modified and the excess average amount of P0.167/kwh starting with MERALCO’s billing cycles beginning February 1994 until its billing cycles beginning February 1998, be refunded to MERALCO’s customers or correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption.” The ERB held that income tax should not be treated as operating expense as this should be “borne by the stockholders who are recipients of the income or profits realized from the operation of their business” hence, should not be passed on to the consumers. Further, in applying the net average investment method, the ERB adopted the recommendation of COA that in computing the rate base, only the proportionate value of the property should be included, determined in accordance with the number of months the same was actually used in service during the test year.
On appeal (CA GR SP 46888), the Court of Appeals set aside the ERB decision insofar as it directed the reduction of the MERALCO rates by an average of P0.167/ kwh and the refund of such amount to MERALCO’s customers beginning February 1994 and until its billing cycle beginning February 1998. Separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petition before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted the petitions and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. MERALCO was authorized to adopt a rate adjustment in the amount of P0.017/kwh, effective with respect to MERALCO’s billing cycles beginning February 1994. Further, in accordance with the decision of the ERB dated 16 February 1998, the excess average amount of P0.167/kwh starting with the applicant’s billing cycles beginning February 1998 is ordered to be refunded to MERALCO’s customers or correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption.
1. Regulation of rates by public utilities founded on the State’s police powers
The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation.
On appeal (CA GR SP 46888), the Court of Appeals set aside the ERB decision insofar as it directed the reduction of the MERALCO rates by an average of P0.167/ kwh and the refund of such amount to MERALCO’s customers beginning February 1994 and until its billing cycle beginning February 1998. Separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petition before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted the petitions and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. MERALCO was authorized to adopt a rate adjustment in the amount of P0.017/kwh, effective with respect to MERALCO’s billing cycles beginning February 1994. Further, in accordance with the decision of the ERB dated 16 February 1998, the excess average amount of P0.167/kwh starting with the applicant’s billing cycles beginning February 1998 is ordered to be refunded to MERALCO’s customers or correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption.
1. Regulation of rates by public utilities founded on the State’s police powers
The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation.
Labels:
Constitutional Law II,
Political Law
Taxicab Operators v. The Board of Transportation [GR L-59234, 30 September 1982]
Facts:
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience.
On 10 October 1977, Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular 77-42 which phases out old and dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the NCR, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981.
On 27 January 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT (Case 80-7553), seeking to nullify MC 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. On 16 February 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a “Manifestation and Urgent Motion”, praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on 20 February 1981. On 28 November 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a “Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition” praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on 1 January 1982. Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located. On 29 December 1981, the present Petition was instituted.
The Supreme Court denied the writs prayed for and dismissed the petition; without costs.
1. Rationale behind exercise of police power
The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
On 10 October 1977, Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular 77-42 which phases out old and dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the NCR, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981.
On 27 January 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT (Case 80-7553), seeking to nullify MC 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. On 16 February 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a “Manifestation and Urgent Motion”, praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on 20 February 1981. On 28 November 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a “Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition” praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on 1 January 1982. Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located. On 29 December 1981, the present Petition was instituted.
The Supreme Court denied the writs prayed for and dismissed the petition; without costs.
1. Rationale behind exercise of police power
The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
Labels:
Constitutional Law II,
Political Law
Ermita-Malate Hotel/Motel vs. City of Manila (20 SCRA 849)
Facts:
On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following provisions questioned for its violation of due process:
- refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view;]
- prohibiting admission to less than 18 years old;
- usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 or 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);
- making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
- Cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.
Issue:
Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?
Held:
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is no violation of constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.
Labels:
Constitutional Law II,
Political Law
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