Facts:
Petitioner
, a member of the municipal board of the City of Manila, criticized
the acts of certain government officials in connection with the
general election for Assemblymen held on November 8, 1938 in one of
the local dailies. The statement as published in the issue of La
Vanguardia of November 17, 1938, included the following statements:
“… In
Manila,
the
opposition
should
have
won
the
November
8
elections,
but
lost
instead
because
of
a
disastrous
division
due
to
people
who
commercialized
their
candidacies.
"The
Constitution
prohibits
the
reelection
of
the
President
precisely
so
that
the
President
may
devote
all
his
time
to
the
administration
of
public
affairs
for
the
welfare
of
the
people,
but
the
President
was
the
first
to
play
politics.
Publicly
expressing
his
preference
for
candidates
of
his
liking;
and
with
the
President
all
other
officials
of
the
government
also
moved,
taking
part
in
electoral
campaigns.
"With
the
government
machinery
feverishly
functioning
to
flatten
the
opposition
and
prevent
candidates
supported
by
the
people
from
going
to
the
National
Assembly,
and
with
frauds
and
violations
of
all
rules
of
the
civil
service
to
push
to
victory
the
candidates
of
the
Nacionalista
Party
and
the
administration,
all
constructive
opposition
in
the
country
is
useless
...
"…
It
is
reasonable
to
believe
that
the
President
is
from
this
moment
paving
the
way
for
his
reelection.
It
is
to
be
feared
that
the
new
National
Assembly
will
change
this
wise
provision
of
our
Constitution
to
permit
the
reelection
of
President
Manuel
L.
Quezon."
The
day following the publication of the foregoing statement, the
petitioner received a letter, where she is informed that she needs to
appear before the Commisioner of Civil Service to prove her
statements otherwise she may be suspended or removed from office.
At
the appointed time, the petitioner, accompanied by her counsel,
appeared at the office of the respondent and delivered to him a
letter, Annex B, in which she voiced objection to the authority of
the respondent to conduct the investigation. The respondent
Commissioner did not desist from proceeding with the investigation,
but announced before adjourning the hearing of November 22nd that he
would decide the question raised as to his jurisdiction on November
26, 1938.
It
was at this state of the investigation that the petitioner filed in
this court her original petition for prohibition of November 25,
1938, in which she at the same time prayed for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent commisioner from
continuing with the investigation.
Issues:
- WON the courts have jurisdiction over this case
- WON the president has the power to order the investigation
- WON the investigation is in accordance with the law
Ratio/Holding:
The
petition
is
hereby
dismissed,
with
costs
against
the
petitioner.
1.
Yes.
In
the
present
case,
the
President
is
not
a
party
to
the
proceeding.
The
Commissioner
of
Civil
Service
is
the
party
respondent
and
the
theory
is
advanced
by
the
Government
that
because
an
investigation
undertaken
by
him
is
directed
by
authority
of
the
President
of
the
Philippines,
this
court
has
no
jurisdiction
over
the
present
proceedings
instituted
by
the
petitioner,
Carmen
Planas.
The
argument
is
farfetched.
A
mere
plea
that
a
subordinate
officer
of
the
government
is
acting
under
orders
from
the
Chief
Executive
may
be
an
important
averment,
but
is
neither
decisive
nor
conclusive
upon
this
court.
Like
the
dignity
of
his
high
office,
the
relative
immunity
of
the
Chief
Executive
from
judicial
interference
is
not
in
the
nature
of
a
sovereign
passport
for
all
the
subordinate
officials
and
employees
of
the
Executive
Department
to
the
extent
that
at
the
mere
invocation
of
the
authority
that
it
purports
the
jurisdiction
of
this
court
to
inquire
into
the
validity
or
legality
of
an
executive
order
is
necessarily
abated
or
suspended.
Not
infrequently,
"the
writ
is
granted,
where
it
is
necessary
for
the
orderly
administration
of
justice,
or
to
prevent
the
use
of
the
strong
arm
of
the
law
in
an
oppressive
or
vindictive
manner,
or
a
multiplicity
of
actions."
(Dimayuga
and
Fajardo
vs.
Fernandez
[1922])
This
court,
therefore,
has
jurisdiction
over
the
instant
proceedings
and
will
accordingly
proceed
to
determine
the
merits
of
the
present
controversy.
2.
Yes.
It
is not denied that the President did authorize the issuance of the
order, but it is contended "that the said investigation with a
view to petitioner's suspension or removal is against Article VII,
sec. 11 (1) of the Constitution of the Philippines and is not
warranted by any statutory provision." (Par. XV [b], amended
petition.) It, therefore, becomes necessary to inquire into the
constitutional and legal authority of the President to order the
investigation which has given rise to the present controversy.
A
perusal
of
our
Constitution
will
show
that
extensive
authority
over
the
public
service
is
granted
the
President
of
the
Philippines.
Article
VII
of
the
Constitution
begins
in
its
section
1
with
the
declaration
that
"The
Executive
power
shall
be
vested
in
a
President
of
the
Philippines."
All
executive
authority
is
thus
vested
in
him,
and
upon
him
devolves
the
constitutional
duty
of
seeing
that
the
laws
are
"faithfully
executed."
(Art.
VIII,
sec.
11,
subsec.
1,
last
clause.)
In
the
fulfillment
of
this
duty
which
he
cannot
evade,
he
is
granted
specific
and
express
powers
and
functions.
(Art.
VII,
sec.
11.)
In
addition
to
these
specific
and
express
powers
and
functions,
he
may
also
exercise
those
necessarily
implied
and
included
in
them.
(Myers
vs.
United
States
[1926])
The
National
Assembly
may
not
enact
laws
which
either
expressly
or
impliedly
diminish
the
authority
conferred
upon
the
President
of
the
Constitution.
(Cf.
Concepcion
vs.
Paredes
[1921])
The
Constitution
provides
that
the
President
"shall
have
control
of
all
the
executive
departments,
bureaus,
and
offices"
(Art.
VII,
sec.
11
[1],
first
clause)
and
shall
"exercise
general
supervision
over
all
local
governments
as
may
be
provided
by
law"
(Ibid,
second
clause).
This
power
of
control
and
supervision
is
an
important
constitutional
grant.
The
President
in
the
exercise
of
the
executive
power
under
the
Constitution
may
act
through
the
heads
of
the
executive
departments.
Independently
of
any
statutory
provision
authorizing
the
President
to
conduct
an
investigation
of
the
nature
involved
in
this
proceeding,
and
in
view
of
the
nature
and
character
of
the
executive
authority
with
which
the
President
of
the
Philippines
is
invested,
the
constitutional
grant
to
him
of
power
to
exercise
general
supervision
over
all
local
governments
and
to
take
care
that
the
laws
be
faithfully
executed
must
be
construed
to
authorize
him
to
order
an
investigation
of
the
act
or
conduct,
of
the
petitioner
herein.
Supervision
is
not
a
meaningless
thing.
It
is
an
active
power.
It
is
certainly
not
without
limitation,
but
it
at
least
implies
authority
to
inquire
into
facts
and
conditions
in
order
to
render
the
power
real
and
effective.
If
supervision
is
to
be
conscientious
and
rational,
and
not
automatic
and
brutal,
it
must
be
founded
upon
a
knowledge
of
actual
facts
and
conditions
disclosed
after
careful
study
and
investigation.
Viewed
from the totality of powers conferred upon the Chief Executive by our
Constitution, we should be reluctant to yield to the proposition that
the President of the Philippines who is endowed with broad and
extraordinary powers by our Constitution, and who is expected to
govern with a firm and steady hand without vexatious or embarrassing
interference and much less dictation from any source, is yet devoid
of the power to order the investigation of the petitioner in this
case. We should avoid that result.
The
deliberations
of
the
Constitutional
Convention
show
that
the
grant
of
the
supervisory
authority
to
Chief
Executive
in
this
regard
was
in
the
nature
of
a
compromise
resulting
from
the
conflict
of
views
in
that
body,
mainly
between
the
historical
view
which
recognizes
the
right
of
local
self-government
(People
ex
rel.
Le
Roy
vs.
Hurlbut
[1871])
and
the
legal
theory
which
sanctions
the
possession
by
the
state
of
absolute
control
over
local
governments
(Booten
vs.
Pinson,
[1915]).
The
result
was
the
recognition
of
the
power
of
supervision
and
all
its
implications
and
the
rejection
of
what
otherwise
would
be
an
imperium
in,
imperio
to
the
detriment
of
a
strong
national
government.
Apart
from the constitutional aspect, we find that section 64 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 provides as follows:
"In
addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-General
(President) shall have such specific powers and duties as are
expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in particular,
the powers and duties set forth in this chapter.
"Among
such special powers and duties shall be:
*
* * * *
* *
"(c)
To order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of any person
in the Government service, and in connection therewith to designate
the official, committee, or person by whom such investigation shall
be conducted."
This
provision of the law, in existence before the taking effect of the
Constitution, still subsists. It is not inconsistent with the
Constitution and has not been abrogated or repealed by the National
Assembly. (See sec. 2, Art. XV, Constitution.)
3.
Yes.
The
interest
of
the
public
service
requires
that
these
charges
be
investigated,
so
that,
if
found
to
be
true,
appropriate
action
may
be
taken
against
the
parties
alleged
to
have
been
guilty
of
illegal
acts,
and
if
found
untrue
and
made
without
justifiable
motives,
the
party
making
them
may
be
proceeded
against
in
accordance
with
section
2440,
in
connection,
with
section,
2078,
of
the
Revised
Administrative
Code."
Assuming
that
this
is
not
one
of
the
grounds
provided
by
law
for
which
the
petitioner
may
be
investigated
administratively
(sec.
2078,
Rev.
Adm.
Code),
there
is
weight
in
the
argument
that
the
investigation
would
still
be
in
order
if
for
no
other
purpose
than
to
cause
a
full
and
honest
disclosure
of
all
the
facts
so
that,
if
found
proper
and
justified,
appropriate
action
may
be
taken
against
the
parties
alleged
to
have
been
guilty
of
the
illegal
acts
charged.
The
enforcement
of
the
law
and
the
maintenance
of
peace
and
order
are
primarily
an
executive
obligation.
The
declaration
that
the
President
should
"take
care
that
the
laws
be
faithfully
executed"
is
more
an
imposition
of
an
obligation
than
a
conferment
of
power.
His
oath
requires
him
to
"faithfully
and
conscientiously
fulfill"
his
duties
as
President,
"preserve
and
defend"
the
Constitution
and
"execute"
the
law.
This
duty
of
the
Executive
to
see
that
the
laws
be
faithfully
executed
is
not
limited
to
the
enforcement
of
legislative
acts
or
the
express
terms
of
the
Constitution
but
also
includes
the
due
enforcement
of
rights,
duties,
obligations,
prerogatives
and
immunities
growing
out
of
the
Constitution
itself
and
of
the
protection
implied
by
the
nature
of
the
government
under
the
Constitution.
(Cunningham
vs.
Neagle)
We
are
vigilantly
alive
to
the
necessity
of
maintaining
and
protecting
the
constitutional
guaranty
of
freedom
of
speech
and
of
the
press,
no
less
than
the
right
of
assembly
and
petition
which,
according
to
Stimson
(The
American
Constitution
As
It
Protects
Private
Rights,
152),
is
its
origin
rather
than
its
derivation.
In
the
present
case,
however,
the
petitioner
is
not
denied
the
right,
nor
is
she
being
investigated
because
she
had
exercised
that
right.
She
has
a
perfect
right
to
criticize
the
Government,
its
administration,
its
policies
and
officials,
but
she
may
not,
on
the
plea
of
freedom
of
speech
and
of
the
press,
impute
violations
of
law
and
the
commission
of
frauds
and
thereafter
fold
her
arms
and
decline
to
face
an
investigation
conducted
to
elicit
the
truth
or
falsity
of
the
charges
formulated
by
her.
Otherwise,
the
guarantee
which,
in
the
language
of
Wendell
Phillips,
is
"at
once
the
instrument,
and
the
guarantee,
and
the
bright
consummate
flower
of
all
liberty"
would
degenerate
into
an
unbridled
license,
and
render
the
Government
powerless
to
act.