Facts:
Vicente Garcia was
a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. On 1 April 1975, Garcia was
summarily dismissed from the service on the ground of dishonesty in
accordance with the decision of the then Ministry of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications in Administrative Case 975 for the
loss of several
telegraph poles which were located at the
Sariaya-Lucena City and Mauban-Sampaloc, Quezon, telecom lines.
Garcia did not appeal from the decision. Based on the same facts
obtaining in the administrative action, a criminal case for qualified
theft was filed against Garcia with the then Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Quezon. On 23 January 1980, the trial
court rendered its decision acquitting Garcia of the offense charged.
Consequently, Garcia sought reinstatement to his former position in
view of his acquittal in the criminal case. In an indorsement dated 7
April 1980, Garcia's request to be reinstated was denied by the
Bureau of Telecommunications. Hence, Garcia pleaded to the President
of the Philippines for executive clemency. On 26 August 1981, acting
on the favorable indorsements of the then Ministry of Transportation
and Communications and the Civil Service Commission, Deputy
Presidential Executive Assistant Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., by authority
of the President, per Resolution No. O.P. 1800, granted executive
clemency to Garcia. Garcia thereafter filed with the Commission on
Audit (COA) a claim for payment of back salaries effective 1 April
1975, the date of his dismissal from the service. This was denied by
the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 12 October 1982 on the ground
that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide for the
payment of back salaries and that he has not been reinstated in the
service. It appears that Garcia was recalled to the service on 12
March 1984 but the records do not show whether Garcia's reinstatement
was to the same position of Supervising Lineman. Garcia again filed a
claim to recover his back salaries for the period from 1 April 1975,
the date of his dismissal, to 12 March 1984, when he was reinstated.
In Decision 362 embodied in its 3rd Indorsement dated 23 July 1985,
COA denied the claim stating that the executive clemency was silent
on the payment of back wages and that he had not rendered service
during the period of his claim. Aggrieved, Garcia appealed the COA
decision of 23 July 1985 to the Office of the President. On 21 April
1986, Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., by
authority of the President, denied the appeal "due to legal and
constitutional constraint," holding that the Supreme Court is
the proper forum to take cognizance of the appeal on certiorari from
the decision of the COA, citing Art. XII-(D), Sec. 2, par. 2, of the
1973 Constitution (now Art. IX-[A], Sec. 7, of the 1987
Constitution). Hence, Garcia filed the petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether Garcia is
entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated
pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.
Held:
Yes. Every
civilized country recognizes, and has therefore provided for, the
pardoning power to be exercised as an act of grace and humanity, in
proper cases. Without such a power of clemency, to be exercised by
some department or functionary of a government, a country would be
most imperfect and deficient in its political morality and in that
attribute of Deity whose judgments are always tempered with money.
Our Constitution reposes in the President the power and the exclusive
prerogative to extend executive clemency under the following
circumstances, "Except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress." From among the different acts of executive clemency
spelled out above, the clemency granted to Garcia in the instant case
partakes of the nature of an executive pardon. Time and again the
Supreme Court has unfolded the effects of a pardon upon the
individual to whom it is granted. In Monsanto v. Factoran, the Court
has firmly established the general rule that while a pardon has
generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so
that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as though he
never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes.
The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and
not forgetfulness . It does not erase the fact of the commission of
the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon frees the individual
from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores to him all
his civil rights. Unless expressly grounded on the person's
innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. The pardoned offender regains his
eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by
reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not
generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has
to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages. But,
stated otherwise, if the pardon is based on the innocence of the
individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as
innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged.
When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the
offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences
of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good
reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.
Herein, Garcia was found administratively liable for dishonesty and
consequently dismissed from the service. However, he was later
acquitted by the trial court of the charge of qualified theft based
on the very same acts for which he was dismissed. The acquittal of
Garcia by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt but on the fact that Garcia did not commit the
offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the
charge, the trial court commended Garcia for his concern and
dedication as a public servant. Verily, Garcia's innocence is the
primary reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him,
bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement by
the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Civil
Service Commission. The bestowal of executive clemency on Garcia in
effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the
administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and
ordered his separation from the service. This can be inferred from
the executive clemency itself exculpating Garcia from the
administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which
is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that
Garcia need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former
employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance
of the clemency. Garcia's automatic reinstatement to the government
service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to
Garcia who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what
he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service.
To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of the executive
clemency, i.e., to give justice to Garcia. Moreover, the right to
back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed
and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of
the charges against them. There is no doubt that Garcia's case falls
within the situations aforementioned to entitle him to back wages.
Further, it is worthy to note that the dismissal of Garcia was not
the result of any criminal conviction that carried with it forfeiture
of the right to hold public office, but is the direct consequence of
an administrative decision of a branch of the Executive Department
over which the President, as its head, has the power of control. The
President's control has been defined to mean "the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to the judgment
of the former for the latter." In pardoning Garcia and ordering
his reinstatement, the Chief Executive exercised his power of control
and set aside the decision of the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications. The clemency nullified the dismissal of Garcia and
relieved him from administrative liability. The separation of the
Garcia from the service being null and void, he is thus entitled to
back wages. After having been declared innocent of the crime of
qualified theft, which also served as basis for the administrative
charge, Garcia should not be considered to have left his office for
all legal purposes, so that he is entitled to all the rights and
privileges that accrued to him by virtue of the office held,
including back wages.